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Political coalition formation games can describe the formation and dissolution of
nations, as well as the creation of coalition governments, the establishment of political
parties, and other similar phenomena. These games have been studied from a theo-
retical perspective, but the models have not been used extensively in empirical work.
This paper presents a method of estimating political coalition formation models with
many-player coalitions, and then applies this method to the recent heisei municipal
amalgamations in Japan to estimate structural coecients that describe the behaviour
of municipalities. The method enables counterfactual analysis, which in the Japanese
case shows that the national government could increase welfare via a counter-intuitive
policy involving transfers to richer municipalities conditional on their participation in
a merger.
Keywords: Coalition Formation, Municipal Mergers, Japan
JEL codes: C71, H77
1 Introduction
In recent years, issues surrounding political coalition formation have attracted considerable
interest from both theorists and policy makers. For example, Alesina and Spolaore [1997]
examine from a theoretical perspective what size of countries will form under dierent con-
ditions. If a coalition is dened as the residents of a certain geographic area, then the
formation and dissolution of countries is a political coalition formation game, one that has
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1obvious practical relevance: the dissolution of Yugoslavia, current con
icts in Georgia, and
possible de facto reunication of the island of Cyprus all involve decisions about how many
countries ought to exist and where borders should be drawn. If a coalition is dened as a set
of political parties, then the formation of a government can be seen as a political coalition
formation game, and similarly if a coalition is dened as a set of individual members of
a legislature, then the existence of parties in the rst place is the outcome of some politi-
cal coalition formation game. Once again the practical importance of understanding these
types of political coalition formation games is borne out by recent news: in the 2007 Bel-
gian national elections it was not obvious even long after the election which parties would
form a coalition government, and in Canada in 2005 the defection of members of parliament
temporarily saved the government from collapse.
In some of these cases it is possible to change the rules governing the coalition forma-
tion game, with new rules leading to a dierent and more ecient coalition structure. For
example, a recent proposal in Canada was that members of parliament should be required
to stand for a by-election if changing their party aliation between general elections. Had
this rule been in force during recent parliaments, dierent coalition structures might have
resulted, leading to dierent governments and dierent policy outcomes. Similarly, dierent
laws regarding how municipalities can cooperate to provide public goods, or how farmers
can establish agricultural cooperatives, could lead to very dierent coalition structures with
very dierent welfare implications. If so, then it is important to make sure that the \right"
law is in place. In order to predict the results of dierent laws, however, it is rst necessary
to develop a model of the behaviour of the players participating in the coalition formation
game, and then use this model to predict the changes in behaviour that would result from
the imposition of a dierent set of laws. Although models of coalition formation date back at
least to von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944], relatively few empirical papers have made use
of such models, and in general these papers have not examined the eect of possible changes
in the rules of the coalition formation game being studied.1 There is no immediately ob-
vious estimation strategy for these coalition formation models, since neither existence nor
uniqueness of a stable coalition structure is guaranteed.
This paper presents a method of estimating the structural parameters of a political
coalition formation model. The method is then applied to a recent set of Japanese municipal
mergers (the heisei daigappei), where the national government xed a set of transfer policies
and individual municipalities chose, given these policies, what merger if any they wished
1Desirable properties of some specic forms of coalition formation games, such as two-sided matching
games, have led to extensive empirical study of those game forms [Roth, 2008]. Empirical research on
general coalition formation models has also been limited by computational feasibility: the number of coalition
structures increases exponentially with the number of players.
2to participate in. The parameters that determine municipal preferences over mergers are
estimated, and these estimates are then used to predict the eect of alternative national
government transfer policies. The heisei mergers are particularly attractive from a modelling
perspective, as government policy allowed mergers to occur only during 1996-2006, and
thus the resulting coalition structure can plausibly be treated as the outcome of a single
period coalition formation game.2 Furthermore, the mergers are of interest from a policy
perspective, since due to eciencies of scale the smaller municipalities spend over $10,000
per capita providing the same services that larger municipalities provide for slightly over
$1,000, and almost all of this dierence was being subsidized by the national government.
Overall, then, the paper makes two contributions: rst, the method of analysing political
coalition formation games, and second, the specic results of this analysis in the Japanese
case.
The methodological contribution consists of the use of simulated maximum likelihood
estimation to obtain structural parameters describing players' preferences over coalitions
when the observed coalition structure can be treated as the outcome of a cooperative form
hedonic coalition formation game with non-transferable utility. Two ways of overcoming
problems related to non-existence or mulitiplicity of stable coalition structures are presented.
First, all players are assumed to have the same preferences over coalitions, resulting in the
existence of a unique stable coalition structure [Farrell and Scotchmer, 1988]. A second
and distinct strategy is to allow players' preferences over coalitions to dier, but restrict the
types of blocking coalitions that can form. This guarantees existence but not uniqueness of a
stable coalition structure [Ray and Vohra, 1997], and thus estimation requires an additional
assumption regarding which one of the set of stable coalition structures is actually selected.
The advantages of this approach, however, are that the distributional assumption required on
idiosyncratic preferences is less restrictive and a wider variety of covariates can be included
in the specication.
This method is then applied to the case of Japanese municipal mergers. Following Alesina
and Spolaore [1997], there are economies of scale in the production of public goods, but
also benets to having local policies specically tailored to match local preferences. This
2In general, a problem with applying political coalition formation models to observed data is that political
coalitions once formed tend to persist, and changes that do occur are often separated by large time periods.
The extremely high cost of any realignment means that the stability of existing borders does not provide
much information, and it is not clear what it means for there to be a \stable" coalition structure, if changes
to this structure occur over time at a slow but constant rate. The Japanese data used in this paper mostly
avoids this problem. The scal crisis of the 1990s precipitated such signicant changes in intergovernmental
transfers that in many cases the old municipal borders were eectively untenable, thus leading to a very large
number of mergers during the window when mergers were allowed. Furthermore, during the 1970-1995 period,
national policy had made municipal mergers extremely unattractive, and thus boundaries remained eectively
unchanged even though demographic changes were rendering these boundaries increasingly inecient.
3tradeo creates an optimal size for municipalities, but pre-existing borders may not create
municipalities of this size. These preferences over municipal characteristics imply preferences
over coalitions, and the parameters determining these preferences are estimated by applying
the method just described to data on the mergers that actually occurred, with the functional
form and some parameters for the cost of providing services derived from existing national
government estimates. Geographical features of the data allow the set of possible coalitions
to be reduced to the point where the model is computationally tractable.
The estimated parameters show that, as expected, municipalities prefer to be in coali-
tions that oer higher levels of public goods and have lower population. There are some
dierences between the two methods of estimation: the estimated magnitude of the aversion
to amalgamation is higher when all municipalities are assumed to have the same preferences
over coalitions, and the preference for high income fellow residents lower. The methods of
estimation yield estimates for the optimal population of municipalities of 75,000 or 150,000.
Recent Japanese estimates place the lower bound on the ecient population of a municipal-
ity at 100,000 [Ministry of Internal Aairs 2003] or 120,000 [Hayashi 2002] and the ability of
the model to predict an optimal size close to this, despite using a very dierent technique,
suggests that the magnitudes of the estimated coecients are reasonable. If the average level
of spending on municipal services is assumed to be optimal, then the implied willingness to
pay for small jurisdiction size is about 0.5% of income to cut municipal population in half.
The estimated parameters are then used to examine an alternative national policy where
a nancial incentive is provided for relatively rich municipalities to participate in mergers.
A budget-balanced version of this policy results in higher utility, equivalent on average to
an increase in income of 0.3%, with positive eects at the 5th through 95th percentiles. The
result is somewhat counter-intuitive as the problem the national government was attempting
to solve was the high cost of supporting small, poor municipalities. The result is consistent
with theory, however, since a regressive conditional transfer { taxing everyone and transfer-
ring money to the residents of richer municipalities that participate in mergers { provides
an incentive for richer municipalities to merge with their neighbours, who then benet from
higher levels of public goods. The very poorest municipalities, however, consisting of ap-
proximately 5% of the population, are made slightly worse o by this scheme, since they
are never considered as potential merger partners by the richer municipalities. The richest
municipalities, consisting of a similar fraction of the population, are similarly made worse
o because they never participate in mergers but pay the additional tax.
This transfer scheme mimics the transfers that the municipalities themselves would oer,
if they were able to make such commitments. A second counterfactual policy is thus exam-
ined, where the national government allows decentralized negotiations over transfers to take
4place between municipalities. In this case, where the game is eectively converted into a
transferable-utility game, the outcome depends heavily on the bargaining power of dierent
types of municipalities. While this policy increases the number mergers that occur, it also
leads to potentially very large transfers from poor municipalities to richer ones, and the
exact amount of the transfers cannot be known in advance without knowing the bargaining
method by which municipalities divide the benets of a merger.3
The major contribution of this paper is the development of an empirical framework for the
estimation of political coalition formation models, one that takes into account the theoretical
characteristics of solutions to the coalition formation game, and also allows the analysis of
counterfactual policies. This is an advance over previous techniques: the closest related
work is Brasington [2003], which considers each potential pairwise merger in isolation from
other potential mergers.4 More specically, in models of the type used by Brasington and
others, the probability that players 1 and 2 will form a coalition is unaected by the other
options that 1 or 2 might have. The method presented below is thus the rst to take into
account that the presence of a player 3 and an attractive f1, 3g coalition may disrupt a f1,
2g coalition that would otherwise form. In addition, other recent empirical political coalition
formation papers, such as Alesina et al. [2004], focus on describing patterns that are observed
in political boundaries, while this paper predicts how counterfactual policies would change
the set of boundaries forming.5 With suitable modications, the method used in this paper
could be applied to other types of coalition formation games, possibly in other elds as well
as in political economy.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. The general estimation strategy is
presented in Section 2, including both the version imposing a restriction on the form of
players' preferences and the version using instead a restriction on the types of blocking
coalitions. The use of this strategy in the Japanese case is then described in Section 3,
and potential alternative national government policies are analysed using counterfactual
simulations in Section 4.
3This result is somewhat similar to the theory presented by Armstrong and Vickers [2007] regarding
control of corporate mergers.
4The restriction to pairwise mergers follows from the use of the Poirier [1980] bivariate probit model.
5Brasington [2003], Alesina et al. [2004], and most of the other existing empirical studies of political
mergers focus on American school districts. Miceli [1993], the earliest example yet found, examines the
trade-o that Connecticut school districts faced between eciencies of scale and locally optimal education
quality. Alesina et al. [2004] use a much larger dataset, and examine the relationship between county-level
heterogeneity and the number of school districts and other local jurisdictions. While the estimates in each
of these papers imply a type of coalition formation game, they do not present an explicit coalition formation
model.
52 Theory
Notation follows that of Banerjee et al. [2001] and Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002]. Specif-
ically, let N be the set of players, and S  N a coalition of these players.  is the set
of all possible coalition structures, where a coalition structure  2  is a set of coalitions
fS1;:::;SKg such that every player is in exactly one of these coalitions. Suppose that player
i 2 N has preferences i dened over the set fS  Nji 2 Sg, with i indicating a strict
preference. The extension of these preferences to partitions is easy: if (i) is the coalition
that municipality i belongs to in partition , then  i 0 if (i) i 0(i). Let  S 0
for some coalition S if 8i 2 S; i 0 and at least one of these preferences is strict. The
observed coalition structure is treated as the result of a \hedonic coalition formation game",
where the payo to each player depends only on the coalition to which it belongs, and not on
what other coalitions occur. This is the \hedonic aspect" introduced by Dreze and Green-
berg [1980], except without the possibility of transfers. The inability to negotiate transfers
prevents some coalitions from forming:
Example 1. Let N = f1;2g, and ui a utility function describing the preferences of player i
over coalitions, with
u1(f1g) = u1(f1;2g) + ;  > 0
u2(f1;2g) > u2(f2g)
For small , the stable coalition structure is ff1,2gg if transfers are possible, but ff1g, f2gg
if they are prohibited
Ideally, given a set of preferences, there would exist a unique stable partition: First, the
solution set is dened using the von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944] \stable set":
Denition 1. VNM is a stable set with respect to (;<) for some binary operator < if
1. @;0 2 VNM where  < 0 (Internal stability)
2. 8 = 2 VNM;90 2 VNM where  < 0 (External stability)
The goal is to dene < in a way that is intuitively plausible yet at the same time guaran-
tees that the stable set exists, but this turns out not to be trivial. Consider, for example, the
following denition of <:  < 0 if 9S 2 0 such that  S 0 and 8S0 2 (n0);(S0nS) 2 0
or is empty. Unfortunately, with this denition not only is a stable set not guaranteed to
exist, but in general it is not possible to devise another plausible method of selecting a single
partition as the solution of this type of coalition formation game [Barber a and Gerber, 2007].
The following \roommates problem" illustrates this point:
6Example 2 (Gale and Shapley 1962). Suppose N = f1;2;3g and preferences are
f1;2;3g 1 f1g 1 f1;3g 1 f1;2g
f1;2;3g 2 f2g 2 f1;2g 2 f2;3g
f1;2;3g 3 f3g 3 f2;3g 3 f1;3g
With these preferences, no stable partition exists.
Nevertheless, when the Japanese municipalities actually played a coalition formation
game, an outcome did occur. The problem is then how to treat observed outcomes such
as this one when attempting to estimate parameters. There are at least three ways to
proceed: to move to a non-cooperative game structure, to restrict preferences, or to relax
the requirements for stability.
A non-cooperative game is guaranteed to provide a set of equilibrium outcomes, but
it is dicult to use in this case as no information is available about the way in which
the municipalities actually negotiated, or who made what oers, and so forth. Thus, the
specication of the rules of the game would be essentially arbitrary. If the equilibria did not
depend on the rules, then the lack of information about the negotiation process would not be
important, but it is fairly easy to see that in this sort of coalition formation game, dierent
rules produce dierent outcomes. For example, if there are a nite number of periods in which
a proposer can propose a coalition or coalition structure, then the probability with which
various municipalities are selected to be the proposer will change the types of proposals made
and accepted. Radically dierent parameter estimates could be obtained by using dierent
probabilities of having a municipality selected as proposer, and there is no information
available on what reasonable proposer weights would be, or even whether the proposer type
framework is appropriate. Thus, non-cooperative form games will not be used as part of the
estimation strategy. The other two potential solutions given above will be used, however.
First, preferences will be restricted so as to ensure that a unique stable partition exists.
Second, a more general utility function will be used, but certain types of deviations will not
be allowed. This ensures the existence of a stable partition, but not its uniqueness, and so
estimation becomes somewhat more complicated.
72.1 Restricted Preferences Approach
Consider the following restriction on the form of ui, the utility that player i derives from a
coalition:
ui(S) = u(S) + i
u(S) = v(XS;) + S
Here v is a function of characteristics XS of S, taking parameters . The econometrician
observes XS and knows the functional form of v, and the objective is to estimate the param-
eters . The error term S is of a known distribution. The important restriction here is that
if S i S0 then 8j;S j S0. That is, all agents have identical preferences over coalitions.
Theorem 1 (Farrell and Scotchmer 1988). If all agents have identical preferences over
coalitions, a generically unique stable partition exists.
Proof. The unique stable partition can be constructed as follows:
0. Let V 0 be the set of all potential coalitions, and start with 0 = ; and k = 0
1. Find Sk
max such that 8S 2 V k, u(S) < u(Sk
max)
2. Set k+1 = k [ fSk
maxg and V k+1 = fSjS 2 V k;S \ Sk
max = ;g
3. If V k+1 6= ;, repeat from 1.
This restriction on the idiosyncratic error term is strong: it implies that all the unobserved
characteristics of a coalition are enjoyed equally by all its members. For example, in the case
of municipal mergers, it rules out the possibility that a large municipality merging with a
smaller neighbour might take advantage of its dominance on the new amalgamated municipal
council in order to geographically skew public spending. The major benet of placing this
restriction on the error term is that it guarantees uniqueness, and thus estimation does not
require any assumption about an equilibrium selection rule.6
6It may be possible to weaken the restrictions on the error term somewhat in the future by instead
assuming the monotonic median voter property Acemoglu et al. [2008b].
8Suppose that partition 0 is actually observed. The parameters  can be estimated via
simulated maximum likelihood. The likelihood of 0 occurring is








where 0 denotes the vector fSjS 2 0g. This integral can be numerically approximated by






Because of the \convenient error partitioning" [Train, 1995] of the above, the probability
can be expanded into a product of independent events.7 Let V be the set of all potential
coalitions. Then







where perpS0 = fSjS 2 0;S \ S0 6= ;g is the set of \perpetrators" necessary to deviate to
S0. The likelihood function used for optimization is thus











2.2 Relaxed stability requirements
Now suppose that a less restrictive form was imposed on preferences:
ui(S) = v(Xi;XS;) + iS
Here, the utility a player derives from a coalition can depend on interactions between the
player's characteristics and those of the coalition, and similar the  for a given coalition can
vary across players. In this case, the existence, but not uniqueness of a stable partition can
be guaranteed so long as some restrictions are placed on the types of blocking coalitions
7That is, once the 0 have been drawn, and thus the u(S) are known for S 2 0, the events u(S0) > u(S)
and u(S00) > u(S) are independent. This conditional independence allows conditional probabilities to be
expressed as products of the relevant independent events.
9that can form. In particular, only two types of potential deviations will be considered when
evaluating whether a given partition is stable: renements, where subcoalition of a single
existing coalition breaks o to form a coalition, and coarsenings, where two or more existing
coalitions merger in order to form a new coalition.
To solve this problem, Ray and Vohra [1997] only allow deviating coalitions to force
renements of a partition, and Diamantoudi and Xue [2007] show that this creates a stable
set. Because hedonic games are simpler than the \equilibrium coalition structures" that Ray
and Vohra examine, renements and coarsenings will be treated identically. Otherwise, the
theory follows that presented in Ray and Vohra.
Denition 2.  ! 0 if 9S such that either  %S 0 or  &S 0, where
1.  %S 0 if 0 n  = S such that  S 0 and S =
S
Q for some Q  
2.  &S 0 if 9S 2 0 such that  S 0 and
a)  n 0 = S0 with S0 =
S
Q0 for some Q0  0
b) @ ~ Q such that Q0 ! ~ Q
The recursion is well dened since Q0 is a proper subset of 0. Using the terminology
of Ray and Vohra,  is blocked by 0 if either there is a set of coalitions in  that are
unanimously in favour of merging to create 0, or there is a subset of \perpetrators" in 
that are unanimously in favour of deviating from their current coalition. In the former case
0 is the coarsening that results from the merger, while in the latter it is a renement that
includes a coalition for these perpetrators and some arrangement of the \residual" left behind
when the perpetrators deviated, such that the conguration of perpetrators and residual is
stable.
Theorem 2. Let  be the transitive closure of !. Then
1.  = fj@0 such that  ! 0g is a stable set with respect to (;).
2.  is unique.
3.  contains a Pareto optimal partition.
Proof (existence). By construction,  is internally stable. Now take some  = 2 . Then
9f1;:::;mg   such that  ! 1 !  ! m and either m 2  or there is a cycle
with m = l for some l < m. If there is such a cycle, then it must contain both mergers and
dissolutions. Suppose that k %S k+1, and let S
+
1  S be the set of agents that strictly




1 since no agent can be made worse o by a




1 n R) [ P where R is some subset of the residual,
and P 6= ; is some subset of the perpetrators, and (R[P)  S0. Since S
+
m l+1 = ;, at some
point the agents in S
+
2 must be made worse o. This can only happen via renements, and
only if there is a residual smaller than S
+
2 . The latter, though, implies that some subset of
S
+
2 cannot be made worse o, and thus S+ can never be empty. Thus a cycle cannot exist,
and m 2 .
(uniqueness). Suppose that  is also a stable set with respect to (;). Consider the
bipartite directed graph dened by  with  n  and  n  as the two sets of nodes.
Every node must have in-degree of at least one, but there can be no cycles. The only such
graph is empty, and thus  = .
(PO element). Let PO   be the set of Pareto optimal partitions, and   the Pareto
dominance operator. Suppose that PO \  = ; and consider the directed graph dened
by  [   with PO and  as two sets of nodes.
There is no particular reason to believe that this particular partition is more attractive
as solution than the other partitions in . There may be, however, some \solutions" that
seem particularly unattractive: f 2 j90 2 ;   0g. Unfortunately, computational
limitations make placing further restrictions on the solution set infeasible.
2.3 Estimation
Following the notation in the restricted preferences section, let 0 denotes the vector iS;8i 2
S;8S 2 0. Suppose that partition 0 is actually observed. If only partitions in the solution
set  are observed, and every partition in  is assumed to be selected with equal probability,















2 P( 2 j;0;0 2 )
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as N ! 1;jj ! 1
provided that the variance on the normal approximation goes to zero, which will be the
case so long as E[jj] goes to innity as jj does. The actual estimation is performed via
numerical approximation of the above integral. Specically, if E0 is a set of draws from the










Once again because of the convenient error partitioning of the above, the probability can be
expanded into a product of independent events. Let S
"
0 be the set of all coalitions that could
be formed by mergers of the coalitions in 0, and let S
#
0 be the set of all coalitions that are










Now approximate the denominator by randomly drawing a set l  , and dening l and


















P(l S Sj;0;l;0 2 
)
There are two problems with estimating this numerically. First, draws need to be made from
lj;0;0 2 , and second, given a draw of l from the correct distribution, the required
probability needs to be calculated eciently. Fortunately, in both cases an application of
Bayes' Rule is sucient. To draw from lj;0;0 2 , rst dene S to be the idiosyncratic
shocks to coalition S 2 l. If S is not a potential deviation from pi0, then Sj;0;0 2  =
S since no additional information is provided by the fact that 0 is stable. If S is a potential
12deviation from 0, then consider the identity
f(Sj;0) = f(Sj;0;0  S)P(0 S Sj;0) + f(Sj;0;0 S S)P(0 S Sj;0)
f(Sj;0) is equal to the unconditional density f(S), which is known by assumption. The
second distribution on the right hand side is a set of truncated distributions because if
0 S S then it must be true that ui(S) > ui(0), and thus
i > ui(0)   vi(S)
and these can be calculated sequentially. Thus, the desired distribution can be drawn by
simulating from
f(Sj;0;0 S S) =
f(Sj;0)   f(Sj;0;0 S S)P(0 S Sj;0)
P(0 S Sj;0)
which can be done sequentially for each member of S. From a computational perspective, it
is important to avoid simulation \chatter", which would occur if a new  were drawn for each
new proposed ^ , the simplest way of ensuring that 0 was always in the stable set. Instead
of simulating 0 directly, then, draw quantile indices qj, and create j from qj fresh for each
iteration of ^ .
The next problem is using these drawn l to calculate the probability
P(l S Sj;0;l;0 2 
)
where S0 is some coalition not in l. If S0 is not a potential deviation from 0, then the
calculation is identical for those done for 0, described above. However, if S0 is a potential
deviation from 0, then the fact that 0 is stable provides additional information that needs










and since the left hand side can be calculated, and the second term of the right hand side
has the same set of truncated distributions described just above with respect to the l, then




1   P(l S0 S0j;0;l)   (1   P(l S0 S0j;0;l;0 S0 S0))P(0  S0j;0;1)
1   P(0 S0 S0j;0;l)
Everything on the right hand side of this equation can be computed quickly, making opti-
mization feasible.
3 Application
Treating municipal mergers as a hedonic coalition formation problem is consistent with anec-
dotal evidence concerning how mergers are eected. Negotiations regarding compensation
seem to be rare, even though controversy is common and the results of unrest sometimes
signicant. Usually, some of the involved municipalities were in favour of a merger while
others were very much opposed, but those in favour did not promise large transfers to those
opposed in order to secure their cooperation. This suggests that there is some problem with
contractibility in political mergers such that transfers are dicult or impossible, and thus,
as in Acemoglu [2003], the \political Coase theorem" does not hold. It thus seems more
plausible to model mergers as a coalition formation game without transfers. First, a simple
model of public good provisioning is presented, then some of the parameters are estimated
from other Japanese data sources. The data is described, and then the remaining parameters
are estimated via the methods presented in the preceding section.
3.1 Municipal Public Goods Model
Suppose that at time t, each municipality m provides a public good of level gmt to its
residents at a total cost of cm(gmt), with g including public goods such as local roads,
elementary education, waste disposal, and some health care. cm is assumed to be subadditive
in population: cm0 < 2cm if the population of m0 is twice as large as that of municipality m.
To pay for this service provision, the municipality levies taxes at rate mt (possibly restricted
by the national government to  ), and receives transfers Tmt from the national government









14where Ym is the tax base of the municipality, and r is the interest rate. If characteristics of
the municipality are constant across time, the discount rate is the same as the interest rate,
and there is no uncertainty, then the optimal tax rate and level of government services does
not change across time, and everything is perfectly smoothed. Thus, the t subscripts are
dropped, and any short term transfers received (as in the next section) are assumed to be
perfectly smoothed out. Thus, the budget constraint is treated as





In addition to providing general services of level gm, the municipal council also has control
over some (costless) local policies, as in Alesina and Spolaore [1997]. Dierent individuals
have dierent ideal points regarding these policies, and thus as the population of a munic-
ipality grows, so does the utility loss due to having to impose a constant policies over the
entire municipality. Thus, there is a tradeo between providing the public good cheaply, and
having government policies that are carefully tailored to residents' desires. A formal model
of this tradeo is not presented here, but instead, controlling for the economies of scale in
production of public goods, higher population will enter the utility function negatively.8
3.2 Japanese Local Public Finance
Mochida [2006] provides an excellent summary of the development and current state of the
Japanese local nance system. Post-war Japanese scal policy placed great emphasis on
the provision of equal quality public goods across the country, and established a national
standards for the general services that were provided by local governments. To ensure that
every municipality had sucient funds to oer the specied services at or above the standard
quality level, the national government developed a complicated system of transfers, called
8The Alesina and Spolaore [1997] model can be extended to two dimensions in order to handle actual
geographic data, but the reduced form approach is used here because it is dicult to justify any particular
functional form assumption on the utility loss due to government policies being set away from a resident's ideal
point. Although multi-dimensional policy spaces in general suer from cycles, if preferences are Euclidean
and the number of voters is large, then the plausible set of policies, following a reasonable denition such as
the yolk, lies within a small and shrinking region. With an assumption on how the policy is selected within
that region, the remaining diculty would be how preferences of voters determine preferences over mergers.
One possibility here would be to assume that voters will move randomly within whatever merger they join,
and thus do not apply their geography-based policy preferences to decisions regarding which coalition to
join.
15the \Local Allocation Tax".9 The transfer to municipality m is determined by the equation
Tm = max(~ cm( g)   :75 Ym;0) (1)
where  g is the minimum quality of services the municipality is expected to provide, ~ cm( g)
the estimated cost to the municipality of providing those services (referred to as \Standard
Financial Need" in ocial documents),   the xed tax rate that the municipality is required
to charge. ~ cm varies signicantly from municipality to municipality, based on a formula
developed by central ministries. The exposition of this formula consists of approximately
280 pages of Japanese legal text; however, as Figures 2 and 3 show, ~ cm can be approximated
quite well by the linear regression
~ cm( g) =  g(0 + 1POPm) + vm (2)
These gures and equations eectively duplicate those found in an ocial Ministry of Finance
publications, as the linear approximation is well known and commonly used.10 The positive
and signicant intercept shown in Table 1 re
ects the fact that the central ministries believed
that there were economies of scale in the production of public goods, and thus per capita
costs would be higher in municipalities with lower population. At current exchange rates,
 g^ 0 is a little more than $10M. Thus, if the national government estimated costs correctly,
with ~ c( g) ' c( g), the per capita cost of providing  g quality public goods in Ashiyasu village
(population 567) is roughly $22,000, compared with roughly $1,400 in Sakai city (population
790,000).
With almost half of Japanese municipalities having a population less than 10,000, the
decision to provide additional subsidies to smaller municipalities due to their size was an
expensive one. Although there were provisions for municipalities to merge, there was little
incentive for them to do so, because if a coalition S decided to form a new (amalgamated)
municipality, TS would be calculated identically to Equation 1, above:
TS = max(~ cS( g)   :75 YS;0) (3)
Thus almost all savings would be passed to the national government, and even a slight
preference for smaller population jurisdictions ensured that residents would be opposed to
9The slightly-confusing name is due to the fact that it is an allocation to local governments from taxes
collected by the national government.
10A new formula introduced after the period of interest is explicitly based on a linear function of population
and area.
16mergers.11
During the nancial diculties of the early 1990s, the national government implemented
a series of reforms designed to reduce the total transfers provided to municipalities while
minimizing the negative eects of this decrease. First, the government substantially reduced
transfers to the smallest municipalities by revising the Local Allocation Tax. This can be
approximated as
Tm = max(~ c
new
m ( g)   :75 Ym;0)
~ c
new
m ( g) =  g(
new
0 + 1POPm) + vm
as shown in Table 2, with new
0 being a little more than half the size of 0.12 Second,
municipalities that merged between 1995 and 2005 would not have their transfers lowered









would be provided for the decade following the merger. This resulted in a strong nancial
incentive for municipalities to merge, as shown by the utility functions derived in the ap-
pendix. By 2006 there were only 1821 municipalities remaining, down from 3232 at the start
of the merger period in 1995. Figure 4 shows the mergers in Shizuoka Prefecture. Mergers
were voluntary, and needed to be approved by the municipal council of every participating
municipality.13 The parameters to the utility function can thus be estimated by examining
the mergers that actually occurred.
3.3 Data
The initial laws implementing the new incentive scheme were passed in 1995, and thus it
would be optimal to use data from before this period. However, some later data is currently
used due to data availability issues. Almost all of the merger negotiations and approvals
occurred near the end of the 1996-2006 window, with most occurring after 2002, and the
latest data used is from 2000. Thus, it seems like this should not be a huge concern. Due to
11In general, the division of a municipality was prohibited. In one case, such a split did occur, but both
of the resulting municipalities were immediately merged with dierent neighbours.
12Previously, mayors were responsible for delivering hundreds of \agency delegated functions" from higher
levels of government, making them bureaucrats as well as elected ocials, and making it possible (at least
in theory) for central ministries to re a mayor for not performing a delegated function according to speci-
cations. \Agency delegated functions" were also abolished, and responsibility was devolved in many cases
to mayors and municipal councils.
13In about a third of cases, referenda were held. Nominally, these were consultative, but in general the
municipal council would not vote opposite to a referendum result
17disorganization, coordination failure, or for political reasons, a few mergers occurred after
the end of the merger window. These \late" merging municipalities did not benet from the
incentive scheme described above, and are not considered in the estimation described below.
There were 3382 municipalities at the start of the merger period, divided into 47 pre-
fectures (similar to US states). Since mergers do not cross prefectural boundaries, each
prefecture is treated as a separate game in the following sections. Surface area data for each
municipality is obtained from a 1996 survey conducted by Geographical Survey Institute, an
arm of the Japanese national government. Municipal population data comes from the 2000
national census as reported by the Home Aairs Ministry, but should shortly be replaced
with 1995 census data. Taxable income from 1996 is used as a proxy for the municipal tax
base, with income data, as well as the list of mergers that actually occurred come from the
Asahi Shimbun minryoku. To construct the set of possible coalitions, as described in more
detail later, information on which municipalities share a border is taken from Global Map
les for Japan.
The nancial data to generate Table 1 is from the shichouson betsu kessan joukyou shirabe,
which is an ocial national government report of municipal nances. The 1996-1997 scal
year data is used as this is the rst year available electronically. To determine the new
transfer policy, as shown in Table 2, the 2006-2007 scal year data is also used. Because
of the large transfers from the national treasury to local governments, this data is handled
quite carefully by ocials in the central ministries and is generally regarded as accurate,
particularly the sections produced by the central government itself. The isolated incidents
of fraud reported generally relate to variables reported by the municipalities, which are not
used in this paper.
There are no missing values in any of the nancial data or surface area data. In the
population data, approximately 6 values are missing because one merger took place before
the data was issued, and thus the old municipalities were not reported. This will be dealt
with by nding an older version of the data. The 23 special wards covering the area of
pre-war Tokyo city, although having powers similar to municipalities, are excluded from
the analysis because any enlargement of this sui generis area would likely involve adding
more wards, rather than changing the borders of existing ones. The 12 \designated cities",
which have some powers normally reserved for prefectures, are omitted from the nancial
calculations because their additional responsibilities increase their required spending, but
they are included in the rest of the analysis as regular cities. The categories of \core city"
and \special city" were created after the merger period, and thus do not directly aect
the data. However, the policy-setting powers of these municipalities are slightly dierent,
and this may have provided an incentive for coalitions to form that met the threshold for
18classication into one of these categories. This is currently ignored, but could be considered
later. Similarly, the policy distinctions between city (shi), town (chou), and village (son)
are ignored, although they could be added as dummy variables at a later date. Counties
(gun) are statistical divisions, and have no government structure; however, because they
are historical units, by some accounts county lines are re
ected in the patern of mergers
observed. This data is also available, and could be taken into account at a later time.
3.4 Estimation
Suppose that for any coalition S, the utility of municipality i in the coalition is given by
ui(S) = 1 log((1   S)yi) + 2 loggS + 3 logPOPS + 4 logAREAS + XS + iS
where XS are other xed characteristics of the coalition.14 The third term re
ects the value
that residents place on smaller jurisdictions that can tailor government policies more carefully
to re
ect local concerns, and the fourth term is included because heterogeneity of policy ideal
points may be greater when the same population is spread out over a larger area. Income
per capita and a dummy for whether the coalition is actually a merger (i.e. non-singleton)
being the only column in XS. In the future, however, additional interaction terms could be
included. For estimation via the restricted preferences method, the restriction iS = jS = S
is required.
While de jure municipalities were given the power to set taxes as part of the reforms,
there is a belief that de facto they do not have much authority to change tax rates, and there
appear to have been very few signicant shifts in tax rates. Thus, estimation is performed
assuming that local governments cannot change the tax rate, which is xed at  . This tax
revenue, combined with transfers, then determines the amount of general services provided.15
The determination of V , the set of potential mergers that need to be checked during
estimation, is slightly more problematic. There are a number of large mergers observed,
with the largest involving 15 municipalities. Almost all observed mergers are geographically
contiguous; however, even after restricting V to contiguous coalitions of size 15 or less, there
are still over 1016 possibilities, which is computationally infeasible. Many of these coalitions
look very dierent than the actually observed coalitions, however. In particular, they tend
14The existence of a representative agent is not obvious, since if many dierent potential merger partners
exist, and individuals are allowed to have arbitrary preferences, then Arrow's Impossibility Theorem applies.
If the only choice that needs to be made is which merger to pick, then \intermediate preferences" would
guarantee that the median voter is the representative agent. To have such a voter exist, though, heterogeneity
must be one dimensional and have a specic form [Grandmont 1978].
15Since the transfers are phased out after ten years, the present value of this amount is used to determine
the eective transfer after smoothing.
19to be a thin line of municipalities, stretching almost all the way across a prefecture. The
actually observed coalitions, on the other hand, look like ellipses. Figure 5 shows a merger
that actually occurred (Hanamatsu city, in Shizuoka prefecture, involving 12 municipalities),
while Figure 6 shows a typical randomly generated contiguous coalition of the same size. The
randomly generated coalition in this case suers from a defect that is not considered in the
utility function given above: because of its elongated shape, travel time to a single centrally-
located city hall other such facility would be extremely high for residents starting in certain
parts of the amalgamated municipality. Similarly, the cost of visiting the more remote parts
of the new municipality would likely be excessive for centrally located municipal bureaucrats.
These sorts of coalitions are thus ruled out of consideration by the use of a restriction related
to the surface area to perimeter ratio of the coalition. Because the RAND-ESU [Wernicke
2006] algorithm used to generate the coalitions is limited in the types of restrictions it
can accomodate, this restriction is formulated in terms of graph theory characteristics, an
approximation which makes implementation computationally feasible.
The randomly generated potential coalition shown in Figure 6 diers from actually ob-
served coalitions in that it borders over 30 other municipalities, whereas the actually observed
coalitions of this size never border more than 9. A restriction is placed on the number of
municipalities that the coalition can border is introduced, with an upper bound based on
the maximum in the actually observed mergers. This restriction dramatically reduces the
number of large coalitions that need to be considered: with 15-municipality coalitions, only 1
coalition in 10 billion has a small enough number of neighbours. This reduces the total num-
ber of alternatives that need to be considered to about 5 million, which is computationally
feasible.
Another problem, only relevant to the estimation via relaxed stability requirements, is the
estimation of the size of the stable set. Since the number of partitions grows exponentially
with the number of municipalities, it is not possible to examine all partitions. The total
number of partitions is unknown but bounded above by the Bell numbers (Sloane #A000110),
which are greater than 10100 for larger prefectures such as Hokkaidou. Thus, instead, a
random sample is drawn; however, it is not trivial to randomly sample from a set which is
too large to be enumerated. Thus, random draws are obtained using Markov chains. Let
the state space X be the set of all partitions, and the transition matrix P be
Pxy = k if y can be created by either breaking apart one coalition in x into subcoalitions,
or merging coalitions in x together to create one new coalition
Pxy = 0 8y 6= x that do not meet the above condition
Pxx = 1  
P
y6=x Pxy
Since the state space is nite, this creates a valid transition matrix for suciently small
20k. P describes a reversible Markov chain, since a transition from x to y via merging implies
a possible transition from y to x via a breakup, and vice versa. The chain is connected,
since any partition can be obtained by rst breaking all coalitions down to singletons, and
then constructing the desired partition. There is thus a unique stationary distribution,
since the chain satises the detailed balance condition [Robert and Casella 2004]. Moreover,
the stationary distribution gives equal probability to each state, and thus draws from the
stationary distribution are equivalent to random draws from the set of all partitions. These
draws can be performed using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
Unfortunately, the number of transitions that need to be considered is too large to be
computationally feasible. The number of ways a size 15 coalition could be broken down
into sub coalitions could be as high as a billion, and thus it is not practical to enumerate
all the possible transitions. Instead, the approach introduced by Wernicke [2006] for the
RAND-ESU algorithm will be used. Let p be a length 15 vector of \cut probabilities" and
let Q be a set of subcoalitions of S that form a partition of S. Then enumerate a member of
Q with probability
Q
i2f1;:::;jSjg pi. This gives each member of Q an equal probability of being
enumerated, but allows for a much smaller, randomly selected set to be considered. So long
as this randomly selected ~ Q is re-randomized each time a given state is reached, then the
properties of the above Markov chain are unchanged.
3.5 Results
The results are shown in Table 3. Results are consistent with the theory, with high gov-
ernment services and low population being preferred, as predicted. Having richer fellow
residents also appears to be preferred, but the magnitude and statistical signicance of this
eect depends on the method used. The dummy for mergers is negative under both es-
timation methods, but statistically signicant only in the restricted preferences estimates,
making it unclear whether there was indeed a strong preference for the status quo. The
ratio of the coecients on government services and population imply that a municipality
would be willing to accept an increase in population of one log point in exchange for an
increase in the level of services of either .06 or .12 log points. This implies that, the optimal
population size for a municipality is 75,000 or 150,000, respectively. This accords well with
Japanese estimates of the ecient size for a municipality. The Ministry of Internal Aairs'
\Standard Municipality" has a size of 100,000, and the Ministry [2003] has estimated that
that is the minimum ecient size for a municipality. Furthermore, Hayashi [2002] nds that
the smallest city of ecient scale has a population of 120,000. This estimate is particularly
interesting, since Hayashi uses third-party ratings of municipal service quality, which is not
21used in this paper, but recovers roughly the same population target. Total spending on mu-
nicipal government services accounts for approximately 10% of income, so, if the assumption
of Cobb-Douglas utility is correct, and if the tax rate specied by the national government
is approximately the ecient level, then the implied willingness to pay for small jurisdiction
size is about 0.5% of income to cut municipal population in half.
Although the sign on surface area is not as expected in the relaxed stability requirements
column, the magnitude is tiny. The smaller standard deviation of the error term in the
relaxed stability requirements estimates is an indication that the variables included in the
estimation are relatively more important in determining choices. Additional data that could
be used in the future includes commuting patterns, age and education distribution, and
possibly industrial sectors. In some cases it might be possible to also replace means with
medians, since the variance (but not the precise distribution) of income is known for each
municipality. Finally, prefecture xed eects could be considered, although this presents
some computational issues.
4 Counterfactual simulations
A major advantage of having coecient estimates for a structural model is the ability to
conduct counterfactual analysis. Here, two alternative national government policies will be
examined: rst, an incentive scheme for richer municipalities that participate in mergers; sec-
ond, national government enforcement of transfers negotiated between municipalities during
the coalition formation process.
4.1 Incentives to merge
Suppose that the national government oered an additional, budget balanced incentive for
certain municipalities to merge. The targeted municipalities should be those that are most
likely to be opposed to mergers that would benet other municipalities, and the most likely
municipalities to fall into that category are richer municipalities. Consider the policy that
oered a transfer equivalent to 0.3% of income, to residents of richer municipalities that par-
ticipated in a merger, where a \richer" municipality is dened as one that had above average
income per capita in more than half of the potential mergers they could have participated
in. This transfer would be paid for by an increase in the income tax on everyone. This
type of subsidy preserves the existence of a unique stable partition, since it is equivalent
to increasing um for rich municipalities while at the same time decreasing u(S) for those
singleton coalitions that consist of a single rich municipality.
22There are two dierent types of questions that could be asked regarding the eect of this
policy. One is whether, conditional on the observed outcome occurring, the counterfactual
policy would have yielded a better outcome. The other is whether the counterfactual policy
would have yielded a better outcome without any information about what outcome occurs
under the actually implemented policy. The dierence concerns the way the  are drawn.
In this section, the rst case will be considered, while in the next section the latter will be
estimated.
Given that the observed outcome occurred under the actually implemented policy, and
assuming that the true  are exactly the estimated ^ , the distribution of  is no longer
i.i.d.; however, draws can be made from fj0 stable;g via Gibbs sampling. Then, for each
of these draws of , the stable partition under the counterfactual policy can be computed
via the algorithm given in the proof of Theorem 1. The changes in utility, averaged over
several simulations, are shown in Figures 7 and 8. In one representative simulation, out
of 3822 municipalities, 784 received the new incentive transfer but also merged under the
original policy, and there were 176 municipalities that participated in mergers that did not
occur under the original policy. The mean change in utility is equivalent to an increase
in income of 0.3%.16 However, even though almost all quantiles of the utility distribution
are shifted upwards, the new policy is not rank preserving, and a signicant number of
municipalities would be better o under the actual policy. In each of the simulations, there
were a few dozen municipalites that were in mergers under the actual policy, but whose
merger partners abandoned them for another coalition under the alternative policy. Thus,
not all municipalities would be in favour of switching to the alternative policy.
4.2 Transferable utility
Suppose that the central government oered to enforce whatever transfers resulted from
decentralized negotiations amongst municipalities. That is, if municipality m promised to
make a certain transfer from its current residents to the current residents of municipality n,
the central government would ensure that this was actually carried out. Assume that the
transfers negotiated are \small", in the sense that a linear approximation of utility around
transfers of zero is reasonable:
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16The fact that this is the same as the size of the additional transfer oered is purely coincidental.
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zij + 1log((1   S)yi) + ::: + iS
and thus ~ u approximates a standard transferable utility cooperative game. This does not
have a unique solution, but is covered by the Ray and Vohra [1997] approach detailed above,
and so will result in some sort of stable set. If random  are drawn, then some idea of
the eciency gain of enforcing the TU game, versus simply administering a xed incentive
structure, can be obtained. The exact transfers, however, depend on exactly how the surplus
from the coalition is divided. It seems extremely unlikely that poor municipalities would have
more bargaining power than rich municipalities, and thus an \equitable" distribution of the
surplus seems to be the most optimistic scenario. A more pessimistic scenario would give
most of the bargaining power to richer municipalities, with a resulting increase in post-merger
inequality.
The nucleolus is used as a \best case" equitable division. It is the allocation which max-
imizes over all potential deviating coalitions S0 the smallest dierence between the amount
allocated to the members of S0 and that which they could obtain if they deviated. 100
separate draws of  were performed, and the resulting nucleoli were averaged. This was
compared to the no-transfer case, using the same 100 draws of . The results are shown
graphically in Figure 9. Poorer municipalities are worse o, relative to the no-transfers case,
while richer municipalities are much better o. Thus, making transfers feasible may or may
not be optimal for the national government, depending on its social welfare function.
5 Conclusion
This paper estimated the parameters determining preferences in a cooperative form politi-
cal coalition formation game, using two dierent sets of assumptions and denitions of the
solution set.17 The results are consistent with intuition, and are used to examine potential
17One potential incentive for mergers that is not considered in this paper is the gappei tokurei sai, special
bond issues allowed for municipalities planning amalgamation. Currently, the estimation strategy assumes
that these bonds, subsidized by the national government, exactly eliminate any direct nancial cost of
merging, such as the construction of a new city hall. It is widely believed, though, that these merger bonds
allowed signicant capital expenditures beyond the actual costs of amalgamation. This additional nancial
incentive to merge could bias estimates, and an attempt will be made to take it into account in future
versions of this paper. This point is due to Prof. Miyazaki.
24alternative national government policies.18 Counterfactual simulations suggest that an alter-
native incentive scheme that rewarded relatively rich municipalities for merging would have
resulted in welfare improvements under most reasonable social welfare functions. Allowing
transfers to be negotiated between municipalities may or may not be superior, depending
on the national government's aversion to inequality and the bargaining power of the various
municipalities. The latter is likely unknown to the national government, and thus even if
transfers between municipalities could be enforced, it may not be benecial for the national
government to do so. Of course, further work could consider other alternative national
government policies.19
At least as important as the implications to government policy, however, is the method-
ology developed. A coalition formation game without transfers accurately describes many
real-world phenomena, but it is rarely estimated in the empirical literature. As the price
of computing power decreases, however, the number of uses of this sort of model that are
feasible should increase. Although the game presented in this paper could be estimated only
because the geographical nature of the data permitted a large number of possible coalitions
to be discarded, in the future such restrictions should be less necessary. The results given
above, then, are hopefully only the rst of many applications of coalition formation models
of this type to actual data.
18Technically income yi should be income of the median voter, but right now mean income is used. It
would be possible to estimate the median income, given the data that is available, but this has not yet been
done.
19For example, one possibility that was not considered in this paper is that of a tax on negotiated transfers.
In the simplest price control model, a tax redistributed to the consumer should be able to mimic a price
control, but with the assurance that the consumers with the highest willingness to pay obtain the good. To
the extent that the inability to make transfers is like a price control at zero, then, it could be that the optimal
policy for the government { rather than specifying a xed incentive scheme to encourage rich municipalities
to merge with their neighbours { would be to allow transfers, but tax them heavily and redistribute the
revenue obtained to the poorest municipalities. Overall, the problem bears some resemblance to the classic
rent control problem.
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29Table 1: Dependent variable is c(gS), cost of providing general services ('96-'97 scal year)
I II III IV V
(Intercept) 1294:6 808:4 834:3 792:2 902:7
(23:0) (24:4) (25:2) (27:1) (21:2)
POPULATION 136:4 136:0 136:6 142:3 142:5
(0:3) (0:3) (0:3) (1:7) (1:3)
AREA 4:3 3:6 3:8 2:9
(0:1) (0:1) (0:1) (0:1)
INCOME.INEQ 0:4 0:3   20:9   12:4
(4:8) (4:9) (4:3) (3:3)
INCOME  1070:4  779:8  164:9  483:4
(69:0) (104:3) (69:1) (79:8)
IS.CITY 324:1 369:8   16:2 295:4
(54:9) (54:2) (59:2) (48:1)
POP*INCOME.INEQ 1:1 0:2
(0:1) (0:1)
POP*INCOME   30:5   8:6
(1:0) (1:5)
POP*IS.CITY 5:4   1:7
(2:2) (1:7)
PREFECTURE X X
N 3220 3216 3216 3216 3216
Units: U1,000,000 (roughly $10,000) per year. POPULATION is in thousands of resi-
dents, AREA is in square kilometers, INCOME is in U1,000,000 per capita per year, IN-
COME.INEQ is the coecient of variation of income, IS.CITY is a dummy variable coded as
1 if the municipality in question is a city, and zero if it is a village or town. PREFECTURE
is a set of dummy variables for each of the 47 prefectures, with the restriction that the sum
of the coecients on these variables must equal zero. Designated cities and special wards
are excluded from the regression because they have additional responsibilities devolved from
the prefectural governments, and thus have higher (and non-comprable) expenditures per
capita.










Units: U1,000,000 (roughly $10,000) per year. POPULATION is in thousands of residents,
AREA is in square kilometers, designated cities and special wards are excluded as in Table 1.
The sample is further restricted to those municipalities that did not participate in a merger
in order to have the same sample in both periods. Thus, the change in coecients represents
a change in national government transfer policy on the same group of municipalities during
the period in question. In
ation during this period was negligible.











IS.MERGERS   0:18   0:001
(0:01) (0:001)
 0:35 0:05
The coecient on government services (gS) is normalized to 1, with the standard deviation
 of the error term (S and iS, respectively) determined by this normalization. INCOME
is income per capita. IS.MERGER is a dummy variable equal to 0 if the coalition S is
a singleton (and thus would not imply a merger) and 1 otherwise. The standard errors
presented in the second column assume that the error introduced by numerically estimating
the size of the solution set is not important.
31Figure 2:
"Standard Financial Need" of Japanese Municipalities
('96−'97 fiscal year)
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33Figure 4:


















































































































































This connected graph represents Shizuoka Prefecture (also shown in Figure 4). \Old"
Hanamatsu City is 22202.












































































































































This connected graph represents Shizuoka Prefecture (also shown in Figure 4).
36Figure 7:



















































































































































Change in distribution of utility, weighting all municipalities equally.
37Figure 8:




















































































































































l l l l l l
Change in distribution of utility, weighting municipalities by population.
38Figure 9:












































The slope is statistically signicant (t=4), although this is not taking into account that
the data is generated from a simulation and the simulation itself is based on estimated
coecients.
39